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OCCUPATION CODE 541110: LAWYERS, SELFREGULATION, AND THE IDEA OF A PROFESSION
JonathanMacey*
INTRODUCTION

In Arizona, lawyers earn on average $45.70 an hour.'
This is
comfortably above poverty wages, but it puts lawyers in sixteenth place on
a list of the top twenty highest paying occupations in Arizona. 2 Lawyers
are ahead of pharmacists and optometrists, but behind chiropractors,
podiatrists and, of course, all matter of medical doctors. Being a lawyer is
not what it used to be. The profession is more competitive, the services
performed for clients are more commoditized, and the work involved is less
rewarding.
This Article first makes the simple point that demographic factors,
including, but not limited to, the decline in lawyers' wages relative to other
professions, the growth in the percentage of lawyers in the population since
1970, and the concomitant increase in competition among lawyers have
conspired to bring about a marked decline in the social status of lawyers
and in the self-esteem of lawyers. 3 These factors, in turn, provide at least a
partial explanation for the apparent and much lamented decline in civility
and general "professionalism" among lawyers. 4 Consistent with this
observation, we have seen the adoption of several aspirational "civility
codes" which suggest that the "legal profession deems itself to be in
5
crisis."
* Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance, and Securities Law, Yale Law
School. I am grateful to Roberta Romano for her extremely valuable comments and to
Robin M. Preussel, Yale Law School Class of 2006, for her exemplary research assistance.
1. Arizona Department of Economic Security, Research Administration, Top 100
Highest
Paying
Occupations
in
Arizona,
http://www.workforce.az.gov/admin/uploadedPublications/1794 TopPayOccs.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 23, 2005).
2. See id.
3. See infra app. C, which presents data on the relative incomes of lawyers and
chiropractors in a sampling of U.S. metropolitan areas.
4. See James A. George, The "Rambo " Problem: Is Mandatory CLE the Way Back to
Atticus?, 62 La. L. Rev. 467, 472 (2002); Thomas P. Sukowicz & Thomas P. McGarry,
Feathers May Fly for Using Foul Language, Chi. Law., Dec. 2002, at 14 (observing that
"[f]or many years now, there has been a perception that incivility, rudeness and the use of
offensive tactics among lawyers are on the rise").
5. Joseph J. Ortego & Lindsay Maleson, Under Attack: Professionalism in the Practice
of Law, http://d2d.ali-aba.org/_files/thumbs/components/PLIT0407-ORTEGO-thumb.pdf
(last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
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Another important factor leading to the observed declines in civility and
professionalism is the increasingly national character of law practice. The
expansion of the market for legal services from being local to being national
in scope contributes to the decline in civility and professionalism in at least
three ways. First, by reducing the amount of "repeat dealing" that occurs
among opposing counsel, national practice reduces the costs to attorneys of
bad behavior because few, if any, social sanctions, such as stigma or
ostracism, emerge to constrain behavior. 6 Second, as law practice has
become more national, lawyers find themselves able to operate in a variety
of important contexts in which they interact with other lawyers, such as
depositions and settlement negotiations, without even the possibility of
supervision, much less sanction, by courts or other competent bodies. 7
Third, as the legal profession has expanded, it has become more
heterogeneous, which in turn has led to less empathy and camaraderie
among lawyers. 8
One might, of course, legitimately ask the question, "so what?" Any
perceived decline in civility or "professionalism" is not only notoriously
hard to measure; it also may be only one of the mere pecuniary externalities
associated with the welcome increase in competition among lawyers. 9
After all, if an externality imposes a cost on a third party, but does not
interfere with any legal or moral right that the third party is thought to
enjoy, perhaps it should not be considered a problem. Certainly, for
example, there is no "right" to be free from the effects of competition.

6. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) (describing how repeat
dealings improve incentives for cooperation); Donald D. Landon, Clients, Colleagues and
Community:

The Shaping of Zealous Advocacy in Country Law Practice, 1985 Am. B.

Found. Res. J. 81 (arguing that lawyers' repeat dealings tend to moderate contentious
behavior). Similarly, Lisa Bernstein observed that "geo-graphical concentration, ethnic
homogeneity, and repeat dealing may be necessary preconditions to the emergence of a
contractual regime based on reputation bonds." Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System: Extralegal ContractualRelations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115,

140 (1992). Also, Marvin Aspen provides an example from one federal circuit:
In the Seventh Circuit's urban courtrooms, trial lawyers no longer appear
frequently against the same opponent or before the same judge, thereby reducing
opportunities for building mutual respect and learning the ethics of a time-honored
profession from seasoned hands. Today's metropolitan lawyer may deal with a
particular opponent lawyer, law firm, or judge only once in his or her career.
Thus, the incentive to retain cordial relationships often dies because the
relationship will not likely become an ongoing one.
Marvin E. Aspen, The Searchfor Renewed Civility in Litigation,28 Val. U. L. Rev. 513, 518

(1994).
7. See generally Aspen, supra note 6, at 515-17.
8. See Christopher J. Whelan, Ethical Conflicts in Legal Practice: Creating
Professional Responsibility, 52 S.C. L. Rev. 697, 721-22 (2001); see also Comm'n on

Professionalism, A.B.A., ".... in the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the
Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism 10 (1986).
9. For a discussion of externalities, including the difference between true externalities
and mere pecuniary externalities, particularly in the context of takeovers, see David D.
Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 Va. L. Rev.
701 (1987).
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Other sorts of externalities, such as the lack of civility among lawyers,
while unpleasant, simply may be an unavoidable, but manageable, price that
society must pay to reap the benefits of a more competitive environment
among lawyers.
In other words, the costs of increased competition may be borne by
lawyers, while the benefits are enjoyed by clients, in the form of lower fees
and better service. This point becomes increasingly strong when one
considers the fact that at least some of the "blame" for any decline in
civility and professionalism must be attributable to the increasing gender,
race, and cultural diversity in the legal profession.' 0 The decline in civility
is, in other words, attributable at least in part to the demise of the "old boys
network" in which informal sanctions, such as ostracism and stigmatization,
have lost much, if not all, of their bite. As the legal profession has become
less of a cozy local club in various locales, so too has the incentive to get
along with one's professional colleagues diminished.
All of this matters, not because romantic recollections of the glories of
the practice of law in a bygone era are worth preserving, but because the
practice of law is still self-regulated. It is worth considering, in light of all
of the changes that have occurred in the economics of the practice of law,
whether such self-regulation is still in the public interest, if indeed it ever
was.

This Article argues against self-regulation of the legal profession. As a
general matter, self-regulation is desirable only where the firms or
individuals subject to such regulation internalize the costs and benefits
associated with generating such regulation." As the prestige of the legal
profession has eroded, so too have the costs of being sanctioned by
professional bodies. Censure by a bar association does not carry much of a
social stigma when the bar itself is not viewed with respect. Rational
lawyers will not spend resources to protect the reputation of their profession
if there is little left to protect.
The first part of this Article explains why, in recent years, life as a lawyer
has become highly competitive. In particular, the barriers to entering the
profession posed by the bar examination and other restrictions-such as the
requirement that lawyers graduate from college and law school-have been
competed away.
Part I explores the various ways in which the new competitive
environment manifests itself and outlines the costs and benefits of the
increased competition among lawyers.

10. For a report on increased diversity in the legal profession, see, e.g., N.Y. County
Lawyers' Association, Report of the Task Force to Increase Diversity in the Legal Profession
9 (2002), http://www.nycla.org/publications/taskforce.html [hereinafter Report to Increase
Diversity].
11. Jonathan Macey & Maureen O'Hara, From Markets to Venues:
Securities
Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2005) (discussing selfregulation in the securities industry).
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Part HI constructs a framework for evaluating the desirability of selfregulation and argues that, whatever value self-regulation may have had
historically, the legal profession and clients would benefit from abandoning
it for a private contracting model that treats clients as investors to whom
lawyers owe standard fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, good faith, and
disclosure. These obligations would exist as default rules around which the
parties could contract. In particular, this part argues that clients should be
responsible for their lawyers' misconduct because clients are their lawyers'
principals both in fact and in theory. This would immediately eliminate the
growing problem of lawyer misbehavior.
Finally, this Article concludes that abandoning lawyer self-regulation
would significantly reduce the unfortunate consequences of the increasingly
competitive environment in which lawyers work.
I. THE PRACTICE OF LAW TODAY

Law has long been an adversarial endeavor. There was a time, however,
when the adversarial aspects of lawyering were tightly cabined within a
clear set of professional norms. Adversarial lawyering was carried on in the
manner of academic debating in which gentlemanly conduct was an
important professional attribute, valued by judges and clients alike. 12 This
is no longer the case.
Today, litigation is likened not to a scholarly debate but to all-out war.
Antiquated notions, for example, the notions of professional courtesy and
civility, are considered at best character flaws and at worst signs of
incompetence or sloth. There are three reasons for the observed decline in
civility and professionalism. First, a collective action problem, akin to a
prisoners' dilemma, exists among lawyers that makes it difficult for
individual lawyers to survive by pursuing a strategy of professionalism and
civility. Second, professional groups have not interceded to solve this
collective action problem by policing lawyer civility. Third, courts have
shown little or no proclivity, or ability, to intercede.
A. The Prisoners' Dilemma Among Lawyers
Lawyers face a collective action problem in the form of a prisoners'
dilemma when they attempt to establish their disclosure policies. 13 The
12. For a discussion of the history of civility and ethics in the American legal profession,
see generally Colin Croft, Note, Reconceptualizing American Legal Professionalism: A
Proposalfor DeliberativeMoral Community, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1256 (1992).
13. In the original version of the prisoners' dilemma, the police have arrested two
suspects on suspicion of armed robbery and have separated them into different rooms for the
purpose of interrogating them. Each prisoner must choose whether to confess and implicate
the other suspect or remain silent. If neither prisoner confesses, police and prosecutors can
obtain a conviction only for the crime of carrying a concealed weapon. If one prisoner
confesses, the government can obtain convictions on both the weapons charge and on the
more serious charge of armed robbery. A prisoner can obtain a drastic reduction in sentence
by confessing, but if one prisoner refuses to confess and his partner in crime confesses, the
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prisoners' dilemma is probably the best known game theoretic construct in
the social sciences. 14 The prisoners' dilemma models the collective action
problem of two groups who must solve an identical problem without
cooperating with each other or coordinating their actions. This model
shows that when groups are unable to cooperate, each group pursues its
own self-interest, resulting in decisions that are suboptimal from the
perspective of both groups together.
Applying this model to the context of professionalism among lawyers,
imagine that there are two lawyers, Enlawyer and Outlawyer. Both lawyers
must choose between pursuing a policy of exhibiting "good," i.e., highly
professional, cooperative behavior, or engaging in bad, i.e., highly
unprofessional, noncooperative behavior. Though it would be better for
both lawyers to behave professionally, each lawyer can benefit herself
individually by behaving unprofessionally, without any risk. The benefit to
the uncivil lawyer is especially good if her opponent adopts a good
behavior policy. The worst outcome for either lawyer would be to adopt a
good behavior policy while her opponent adopted a bad behavior policy.
This is so because, in a world of rivalrous competition for legal services,
each lawyer can act uncivilly in ways that lead the client to think that he is
getting the benefit of more aggressive legal representation. Thus, the only
way that a lawyer can effectively compete for clients is by engaging in
aggressive conduct herself.
A simple example illustrates the point. Imagine that our two lawyers,
Enlawyer and Outlawyer, are identical in every way except that they
represent clients on opposite sides of a lawsuit. Both lawyers have a choice
about whether to act professionally and civilly towards the other. If both
attorneys act professionally and civilly, neither lawyer will suffer relative to
the other during the suit. The problem is that the market, as measured by
client demand for a lawyer's services, will punish any lawyer that acts
civilly as long as other lawyers the client could hire would act uncivilly.

prisoner who refuses to talk will receive a particularly harsh sentence. In other words, no
matter what the other prisoner does, a suspect can improve his own position by confessing
and implicating the other suspect. However, the best result would be obtained if both
remained silent.
14. Barry Nalebuff, Prisoners' Dilemma, in 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and
Economics 89-94 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). The following chart shows how many years in
jail each suspect confronted with a prisoners' dilemma would receive under the four possible
scenarios:
Prisoners' Dilemma:

Prisoner 2 confesses:
.Prisoner 2 does not confess:

Prisoner 1 confesses:
Prisoner 1: 10 years
Prisoner 2: 10 years
Prisoner 1: 3 years
Prisoner 2: 25 years

Prisoner
Prisoner
Prisoner
Prisoner
Prisoner

1 does not confess:
1: 25 years
2: 3 years
1: 1 year
2: 1 year
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Thus, both Enlawyer and Outlawyer have incentives to refrain from
acting professionally. In a competitive environment for legal services,
individual lawyers-or law firms-will obtain the best possible outcomes
for themselves by pursuing unprofessional, highly aggressive strategies
while rival lawyers and firms behave more professionally. However, each
law firm will suffer the worst possible outcome-the loss of its clients-if
its lawyers act benignly while its rivals pursue scorched-earth lawyering
tactics.
This prisoners' dilemma is even more pronounced when one moves the
example from the theoretical world of two lawyers to the real world of
hundreds of thousands of practicing lawyers. In this world, individual
lawyers face strong incentives to "cheat" by acting unprofessionally to gain
a reputation with clients and to score points against litigation or negotiation
rivals. If only a small number of lawyers defect from professional norms,
they will benefit as long as the general market expectation for lawyers is
one of professional conduct. But if there are a large number of these
"defectors," then adhering to a policy of professional conduct is no longer a
viable survival strategy.
Unfortunately, if all lawyers act uncivilly, sooner or later clients and
other market participants will come to realize that such tactics are
ineffective and highly costly. So, as noted above, over the long term, the
best decision for all lawyers is to act professionally.
Thus, the prisoners' dilemma in the context of lawyers' professionalism
is easy to summarize: From the standpoint of lawyers, the best of all
possible scenarios would exist if all lawyers could forge binding
agreements to act professionally. This would be the best way for lawyers to
optimize the available pool of legal talent and to keep the cost of legal
services low and the quality of such services high. However, each firm can
benefit at the expense of its rivals by cheating a little bit on its promise to
act professionally. So, cheating on one's professional obligations is the
dominant strategy because cheating is both (a) the only way to maximize
one's appeal to clients by developing a reputation for aggressive, scorchedearth lawyering, and (b) the only way to avoid the worst outcome by
pursuing a strict policy of professionalism while most other lawyers cheat.
In other words, ethical lawyers face a prisoners' dilemma. Less
professional rivals can benefit themselves at the expense of the
professional, ethical attorneys by making the professional lawyers look like
less vigorous advocates. If this happens enough, however, preexisting
norms of professionalism will collapse under the competitive pressures that
are ubiquitous in the market for lawyers.
Given the contours of this ethical dilemma, rules of professional conduct
are valuable because such rules solve the prisoners' dilemma facing
lawyers. If the sanctions for unprofessionalism are high enough, then
lawyers and law firms no longer would have any incentive to cheat by
acting unprofessionally.

2005]

OCCUPATION CODE 541110

1085

B. ProfessionalGroups
The above discussion raises the issue of why professional groups,
particularly bar associations, have not acted to ameliorate the ethical
collective action problems that practicing lawyers face. If the bar actually
is the predominant self-regulatory organization for lawyers, it should
promulgate regulations that are in the rational self-interest of the group as a
whole.' 5 However, several constraints limit the ability of the bar to control
lawyers.
First, it is difficult to articulate professional norms that precisely define
unprofessional conduct while permitting vigorous advocacy within the
bounds of professional propriety. It is one thing to agree that professional
misconduct needs to be sanctioned. It is quite another to devise a workable
system that can implement a system of sanctions on a day-to-day basis.
Second, since lawyers have strong incentives to avoid sanctions,
individual members of the bar have little incentive to lobby the bar to
impose strict sanctions on other lawyers. Moreover, lawyers benefit from
self-governance, and thus are loathe to take actions that would make the
existence of unprofessional conduct salient to any administrative authority,
as focusing on incivility could lead to criticism of the very status quo
regulatory structure from which lawyers benefit. Thus, it is not surprising
that lawyers are reluctant to sanction each other or to impose particularly
stiff penalties in those rare instances where lawyers are sanctioned. 16 And
it is not surprising that high profile examples of lawyer misconduct that do
not relate to a lawyer's professional obligations, like stealing from the Girl
Scouts or permitting marijuana to be grown on one's property, often elicit
more serious sanctions than professional misconduct, like stealing clients'
money.17
The third problem is that the self-regulatory structure is extremely
narrow in scope. The bar can only regulate lawyers, but lawyers face
increasing competition from nonlawyers. As the U.S. Department of
Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics has observed, growth in demand for
lawyers will be mitigated by the fact that clients "increasingly are using
large accounting firms and paralegals to perform some of the same
functions... [as] lawyers."' 8 Increasingly, professional tasks traditionally
performed by lawyers, such as dispute resolution, mediation, document
handling, real estate transactions, and tax advocacy are being handled by
nonlawyers. When lawyers face increased competition for clients, the
incentive to abandon professionalism grows as now the lawyer must
15. William H. Simon, Who Needs the Bar?: Professionalism Without Monopoly, 30
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 639, 641 (2003).
16. Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession 15865 (2000).
17. Id.
18. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook,
Lawyers, 2004-05 Edition, available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos053.htm (last visited
Nov. 9, 2005.
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demonstrate even more aggressive advocacy in order to retain her client and
earn her fee. Since these external sources of competition are entities
beyond the reach of the bar and its power to impose sanctions for
unprofessional conduct, the incentive to abandon professionalism will
further increase, compounding the problem.
C. The Courts
Courts have not been any better than bar groups at imposing sanctions on
unethical or unprofessional lawyers. Courts are extremely reluctant to
protect lawyers from the unprofessional behavior of their adversaries.
Courts also generally decline to sanction lawyers who bring frivolous suits
for strategic purposes or simply to harass an adversary while generating
fees for themselves. 19 As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit remarked,
[W]e are cognizant of the unique dilemma that sanctions present. On the
one hand, a court should discipline those who harass their opponents and
waste judicial resources by abusing the legal process. On the other hand,
in our adversarial system, we expect a litigant and his or her attorney to
pursue a claim zealously within the boundaries of the law and ethical
rules. Given these interests, determining whether a case or conduct falls
beyond the20pale is perhaps one of the most difficult and unenviable tasks
for a court.
The court acknowledges that zealous advocacy may sometimes
justifiably lead to what may look like uncivil behavior, while at the same
time recognizing that there must be an ethical line that may not be crossed
without reprimand. The court is frustrated as to where to draw such a line,
considering the countervailing forces present in the American legal system.
The Second Circuit also noted in another case that the language and
conduct of attorneys must be considered in the context of what is currently
acceptable in public discourse, which is also difficult to identify. 2 1 It seems
as though courts, or at least the Second Circuit, while recognizing that there
are ethical limits to what can be considered zealous advocacy, are still
searching for some sort of balancing test (i.e., zealous advocacy versus
uncivil behavior as an ethical violation) or standard (i.e., what is currently
acceptable in public discourse) by which to more concretely identify and
sanction incivility among lawyers. So, just how much bad behavior courts
are willing to tolerate is yet to be determined with any precision.

19. See Charles Yablon, Hindsight, Regret, and Safe Harbors in Rule 11 Litigation, 37
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 599, 618-33 (2004).
20. Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 341 (2d Cir. 1999).
21. See Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2000).
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1. Discovery Abuse
Perhaps the most important arena in which one observes unprofessional
conduct is discovery, where insulting and obstructive tactics during
depositions appear to have become the professional norm. Depositions are
critical to the factual development of a case and in identifying the theory of
liability or the defense that should be adopted. However, "[v]irtually all
litigators know that depositions are the forum where lawyer incivility is
often the rule, rather than the exception." 22 Although courts have little
control over this important stage of litigation unless alerted to such abuse
by one of the parties, most have failed even so much as to comment on
tactics of which they are keenly aware. The Delaware Supreme Court is a
notable example, as discussed below.
Certainly the most well-known example of unprofessional and abusive
conduct in the corporate context during discovery is the statements, threats,
and insults made by Joseph Jamail, a highly successful Texas plaintiffs'
lawyer, as he defended the deposition of a Paramount Communications Inc.
23
director in Paramount's high-profile case against the QVC Network.
Although the case was in Delaware state court, Mr. Jamail was not a
member of the Delaware bar nor admitted to practice in Delaware pro hac
vice. Instead, Mr. Jamail personally represented the director, who was a
witness in a deposition that took place in Texas, as an accommodation to
the director.
During the deposition, rather than permit his client to answer questions,
Mr. Jamail attempted to block opposing counsel's questions, by attacking
the opposing lawyer with obscenities and personal insults. For example,
when the witness was asked a question, the examining attorney was told by
Mr. Jamail that he was going to "shut... down [the deposition] if [he did
24
not] go on to [the] next question."
Mr. Jamail then proceeded to call the attorney who was attempting to
take the deposition an "asshole" and warned, "You can ask some questions,
but get off of that. I'm tired of you. You could gag a maggot off a meat
wagon." 25 During a colloquy among the lawyers, Mr. Jamail told his
opponent to "shut up," and asserted that the deposition was going to end in

22. J. Stratton Shartel, Abuses in Depositions: LitigatorsDescribe Response Strategies,

Inside Litigation, July 1994, at 10; see also, e.g., Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525
(E.D. Pa. 1993); In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 552 S.E.2d 10 (S.C. 2001); 7 James
Wm.Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 30.43[3] (3d ed. 2003); Jean M. Cary, Rambo
Depositions: Controlling an Ethical Cancer in Civil Litigation, 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 561

(1996); A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions, 57 Md. L. Rev. 273
(1998); Sandra F. Gavin, Playing by the Rules: Strategiesfor Defending Depositions, 1999
L. Rev. Mich. St. U.-Det. C. L. 645; Janeen Kerper & Gary L. Stuart, Rambo Bites the Dust:
Current Trends in Deposition Ethics, 22 J. Legal Prof. 103 (1998).
23. Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
24. Id. at 53.
25. Id. at 54.
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one hour, "period."' 26 He attacked his adversary's skills, suggesting that the
examining lawyer was incompetent because he had "no concept" of what he
not to
was doing. 27 Ultimately Mr. Jamail ordered the examining attorney
28
witness."
this
with
talk
even
"Don't
further:
witness
the
question
Upon learning of Mr. Jamail's behavior, the Delaware Supreme Court
observed that such behavior was "outrageous and unacceptable." 29 Acting
with "gravity and revulsion," 30 the court found that Mr. Jamail had "abused
the privilege of representing a witness in a Delaware proceeding" by
"improperly direct[ing] the witness not to answer certain questions," being
"extraordinarily rude, uncivil, and vulgar," and "obstruct[ing] the ability of
31
the questioner to elicit testimony to assist the Court in this matter."
However, since Mr. Jamail was not a member of the Delaware bar and had
not been admitted to practice in this proceeding pro hac vice, the Delaware
court could not sanction Mr. Jamail. 32 Mr. Jamail was beyond the
therefore not subject to
jurisdiction of the Delaware bar and judiciary and
33
Delaware's disciplinary rules or rules of conduct.
Lacking a remedy, the Delaware Supreme Court was reduced to
imploring Mr. Jamail to appear voluntarily before the court to explain his
conduct and to show cause as to why his conduct should not bar him from
any future appearance in a Delaware proceeding. 34 Mr. Jamail did not
positively respond to this invitation to voluntarily receive sanctions. The
press reported Mr. Jamail as saying, "I'd rather [have] a nose on my ass
than go to Delaware for any reason," since, he believed, the Delaware
35
Supreme Court had animosity for "exceptional lawyers" like himself.
As egregiously unprofessional as Joe Jamail's behavior was, the story
does not end with the unsatisfying result that he avoided sanctions and fired
off the last insulting words at the Delaware judiciary. Two additional facts
also must be noted. First, it is worth observing that the Delaware judiciary
recently was ranked first in the nation by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
ranking for the fourth year in a row, scoring first in nine out of ten
categories, including timeliness, judges' competence, and judges'
impartiality. These results, from a poll of more than 1400 senior corporate

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

55.
56 n.38
53.
53-55.
55.
56.

35. Brenda Sapino, Jamail Unfazed by Delaware Court's Blast, Tex. Law., Feb. 14,

1994, at 11.
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of Mr. Jamail's deprecating remarks
attorneys, cast doubt on the validity
36
about Delaware and its courts.
Second, and even more disturbingly, soon after this case Mr. Jamail was
honored by his alma mater, the University of Texas Law School, with an
alumni award and a giant statue of himself, which was unveiled at the
school on November 13, 2003, to honor Mr. Jamail's career as a "great trial
lawyer. ' 37 As if this were not enough, a second statue of Mr. Jamail was
erected a year later, making Mr. Jamail the only person on campus with two
statues. 38 This honor is in addition to the many university sites named in
Mr. Jamail's honor: the school's swim center, football field, law school
pavilion (which contains the first statue of him), and the law school's legal
research center. The newest statue of Mr. Jamail will be placed in a corner
of the football stadium near a new statue of the former national champion
football coach and University of Texas legend Darrell Royal.39
The Jamail incident should not be interpreted as an unusual or isolated
example of attorney misbehavior. Perhaps the most interesting thing about
the Jamail case was how easily Mr. Jamail avoided any sort of legal or
professional sanction. This is consistent with the light sanctions that
typically are imposed even on the most egregious attorney misconduct.
2. Name-Calling, Threats, and Frivolous Lawsuits
Another manifestation of unprofessional conduct is the use of
inappropriate accusations, threats, and name-calling to intimidate litigants,
witnesses, or opposing counsel. And of course, unprofessional conduct
manifests itself in the pursuit of bad-faith litigation and the assertion of
40
baseless claims.
For example, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York once required a New York litigator to pay $50,000 in sanctions for his
conduct, where the lawyer sent a pre-suit letter that threatened the
prospective defendant (who was also an attorney) with the "'legal
equivalent of a proctology exam."' 4 1 The sanctioned lawyer's conduct also
included: (a) writing a letter to opposing counsel threatening to "tarnish"
his reputation, (b) making a sham settlement offer with an unreasonable
deadline and then immediately filing suit, and (c) publicly accusing the

36. State of Delaware, Delaware's Legal System Ranked #1 in. Nation for Fourth
Consecutive
Year,
http://www.state.de.us/governor/news/2005/03march/031005%20%20delaware%27s%20legal%20system.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
37. University of Texas at Austin, Law School Celebrates the Unveiling of Jamail,
Reasoner Statues, http://www.utexas.edu/law/news/2003/111303_statues.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2005).
38. Nathan Levy, Texas Campus Stirs as One Man Gets a Second Statue, N.Y. Times,

Nov. 26, 2004, at A28.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Easley v. Kirmsee, 382 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2004).
41. Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 70 F. Supp. 2d 415, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
vacated in part, rev'd in part, 221 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2000).
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defendant of fraud without any concrete evidence to support the claim.
Further, the sanctioned lawyer also threatened to interfere with opposing
counsel's other clients by conducting an investigation to identify those
clients, contacting the firm's former clients, and seeking permission to send
a letter to all the firm's clients to inquire as to "'experiences, good or bad,"'
with the firm's billing practices. 4 3 The lawyer also served overly broad
subpoenas, including a subpoena for all of the firm's banking records and
even one seeking records from the golf course where the defendant played
golf. He also threatened to add a RICO claim to the complaint, to sue the
defendant individually and seek discovery of the defendant's personal
finances, and to send a letter to the court accusing opposing counsel of
criminal conduct if the defendant did not capitulate to his client's
demands.4 4 Finally, the lawyer claimed he would make good on his threat
to "tarnish" the defendant's reputation by contacting a reporter to write a
story about the litigation and that he would engage in unfair tactics at trial,
including cross-examining the defendant in an unfair manner.4 5 The lawyer
also repeatedly attacked the defendant in an offensive and demeaning
fashion, such as calling the defendant "'a lawyer who... has acted in a
manner that shames all of us in the profession,' ..... a disgrace to the legal
profession,"' and an example of "'why lawyers are sometimes referred to as

snakes. '46

Responding to complaints about this conduct, the attorney asserted that
47
his tactics simply reflected proper zealous and aggressive representation.
Unleashing the shop-worn palliative that "[a]lthough a lawyer must
represent his client zealously, he must do so within the bounds of the law,"
the trial court held that the lawyer's unprofessional conduct had gone
beyond the pale. 4 8 Observing that the lawyer treated his opponent in an
offensive and demeaning manner and engaged in a course of conduct
intended to coerce a settlement through improper threats and harassment,
49
the trial court imposed sanctions on the offensive attorney.
Interestingly, however, on appeal the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's holding, and declined to impose sanctions. The court found that to
impose sanctions under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or under the
court's supervisory powers, the "trial court must find clear evidence that (1)
the offending party's claims were entirely meritless and (2) the party acted
for improper purposes. '50 The court was not particularly bothered by the
letter discussing opposing counsel's impending "proctology exam," opining
that, while the letter was a bit harsh, and the proctologic reference
42. Id. at417.

43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 417-18.
49. Id. at 443.
50. Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2000).
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"repugnant," such behavior is merely "reflective of a general decline in the
decorum level of even polite public discourse," and, therefore, was not
egregious enough to merit sanctions. 5 1 Moreover, the circuit court even
held that the subject attorney's personal characterizations of the defendant
as, among other things, "slimy" and a disgrace to the legal profession 52were
mere "colorful tropes" that should not be the subject of much concern.
3. Male Attorney Animus Toward Female Attorneys
Not surprisingly, given the lack of sanctions for old-fashioned unethical
and unprofessional conduct, other sorts of misbehavior, such as gender bias
and threats of physical violence, appear to be on the increase. In one case,
an attorney deposing a witness told the witness that he would like "'to be
locked in a room with [her] naked with a sharp knife,"' and that he needed
"'a big bag"' to put her in "'without the mouth cut out.' ' 53 The South
Carolina Supreme Court publicly reprimanded this attorney for his
conduct. 54 Although in this case the court made public its displeasure with
the attorney's conduct, there were no sanctions imposed.
In another case involving egregiously unprofessional treatment of
women, Nachbaur v. American Transit Insurance Co.,55 a New York
attorney was sanctioned for making disparaging remarks in a letter to the
court where he stated that opposing counsel's abilities "indicate[] that she
fits more as a clown in a circus than an attorney in a court of law." 56 That
the attorney was bold enough to refer to his opponent in such a manner in a
letter to the court is surely indicative of unprofessional conduct, if not bias
of a male attorney towards a female attorney.
In still another case involving abuse of women, an attorney was
suspended from practice for filing a motion containing vulgar language and
false allegations about bribery, and calling his former employer, a woman, a
fraud, a thief, and a liar, and alleging that she did not pay her bills. 57 To top
it off, during the course of a deposition, the attorney accused the woman of
giving him a venereal disease. This is yet another example of a male
attorney attacking a female attorney and making debasing comments
alluding to her gender and sexuality.
The list of abused female attorneys appears to be quite long. In a
deposition in New York, a female attorney was referred to as a "little lady,"

51. Id.
52. Id. at 82.
53. Douglas R. Richmond, The Ethics of Zealous Advocacy: Civility, Candor and
ParlorTricks, 34 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 3, 9 (2002) (quoting In re Golden, 496 S.E.2d 619, 621

(S.C. 1998)).
54. In re Golden, 496 S.E.2d at 619.
55. 752 N.Y.S.2d 605 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
56. Anthony Lin, Queens Attorney Hit with Sanctions over Insult, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11,

2002, at 1. The court discussed the attorney's letter in Nachbaur,752 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
57. Thomas P. Sukowicz & Thomas P. McGarry, Feathers May Fly for Using Foul

Language, Chi. Law., Dec. 2002, at 14.
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a "little girl," and a "little mouse," and instructed to "pipe down," "be
quiet," and to "go away" during the course of her representation of a fourth58
party defendant.
Thus, it is not surprising that Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has been in the forefront of advocating for greater civility in the
practice of law, observing that
the justice system cannot function effectively when the professionals
charged with administering it cannot even be polite to one another. Stress
and frustration drive down productivity and make the process more time-

consuming and expensive. Many of the best people get driven away from
the field. The profession and the system itself lose esteem in the public's
eyes.... In my view, incivility disserves the client because it wastes time
and energy-time that is billed to the client at hundreds of dollars an
hour, and energy that is better spent working on the case than working
59
over the opponent.

While Justice O'Connor was undoubtedly correct in her observation
about the relationship between the efficient administration of justice and
civility, unfortunately there is no evidence that judges are actually taking
60
concrete action to restore civility to the practice of law.
HI. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF COMPETITION

A major cost of the increased competition within the legal profession is
the decline in civility and professionalism among lawyers. It is not
surprising that the practice of law is less civil in the United States than in
Great Britain.6 1 After all, the United States has three times as many
lawyers per capita as Great Britain. 62 The existence of more lawyers per

58. Cary, supra note 22, at 568 (discussing Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d
182, 184 (Sup. Ct. 1992)).
59. Randy J. Holland, President's Message, www.innsofcourt.org/contentviewer (last
visited Oct. 22, 2005).
60. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 52 n.24
(Del. 1994) (quoting Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Address Delivered to an American Bar
Association Group on "Civil Justice Improvements" (Dec. 14, 1993)). Justice O'Connor (as
a judge, attorney, and a woman) was speaking to an American Bar Association group on
"Civil Justice Improvement," which included both judges and attorneys, and thus she was
implying that it was an important issue that required action by members of both the bar and
the bench.
61. See Whelan, supra note 8, at 715-17.
62. See P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives:
Some Anglo-American
Comparisons, 1987 Duke L.J. 1002, 1008. Compare Lawyer Demographics, A.B.A.,
http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/awyerdem2004.pdf
(last visited Oct. 16, 2005)
(providing U.S. lawyer demographics), with Key Facts 2004: The Solicitors' Profession,
The
Law
Society
of
England
and
Wales,
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/secure/file/138589/d:/teamsite-deployed/documents//
templatedata/Publications/Research%20fact%20sheet/Documents/keyfact04v I .pdf
(last
visited Oct. 6, 2005) (providing solicitor statistics), and Bar Statistics-December 2004, The
Bar Council, http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/documents/BarStatsDec04.doc (last visited Oct.
6, 2005) (providing barrister statistics).
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capita is correlated with lower earnings per lawyer, and greater competition
for the relatively smaller pool of client fees available.
In addition, the surfeit of lawyers imposes costs on society because
lawyers faced with more competition without a similar increase in the
number of clients are more likely to lobby for new
laws and regulations that
63
will increase the demand for lawyers' services.
At the same time, however, the surplus of lawyers has benefits as well as
costs. Competition increases not only the rancor among lawyers; it also
improves the general quality of legal services. Clients have a vast array of
choices when they are in the market for legal representation. The growing
heterogeneity of the legal profession also should be viewed as a positive
aspect of the growth of the legal profession, as it represents reduced barriers
to entry for traditionally underrepresented groups as well as increasing
client choice, competition, and, therefore, the quality of legal services.
The dramatic changes in the nature of law practice have both good and
bad implications for lawyers, clients, and for society as a whole. Lawyers
face more competition and less collegiality, while they have to work harder
to repay the capital investment reflected in the decision to attend law
school. On the other hand, the profession is richer for its diversity, and
never before has the law played such an important role in society and in
64
popular culture.
Clients must put up with the costs associated with ever-increasing
amounts of regulation (especially prevalent among businesses in regulated
industries, but also affecting individuals in areas such as governmental tax
regulation and licensing), which provide benefits for lawyers by increasing
the demands for their services, but impose costs on everybody else.
Moreover, like lawyers, clients must, at least to some extent, cope with the
costs associated with the decline in civility in the legal profession.
However, the intense competition among lawyers keeps prices down and
quality high for consumers of legal services.
Similarly, for society as a whole, the changes in the legal profession over
the past few decades have benefits and disadvantages. On the plus side of
the equation, the increased diversity of the legal profession has brought
with it a concomitant increase in attention to rights, particularly minority
rights, and, ultimately, to justice. 65 Lawyers deserve a great deal of the
credit for this state of affairs. The legal profession also deserves credit for
much of the rest of the social change that has characterized the United
States in the post-War era. As J. P. Nettl observed, unlike the situation in
Europe and Asia, "in the United States, the law and its practitioners have
63. See Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69
Mo. L. Rev. 299, 345-49 (2004).
64. See Michael Asimow, Embodiment of Evil: Law Firms in the Movies, 48 UCLA L.
Rev. 1339, 1339-61 (2001).
65. See Report to Increase Diversity, supra note 10; see also A Call to Action: Diversity
in the Legal Profession, http://www.acca.com/gcadvocate/calltoaction/control'html (last
visited Oct. 23, 2005).
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perhaps been the most important single factor making for political and
social change and have time and again proved to be the normal instrument
66
for bringing it about."
On the negative side, as the table below indicates, increased numbers of
lawyers correlates with significantly more litigation, and litigation is an
extremely costly way to resolve disputes. Worse, lawyers tend to ignore the
social costs of new laws when evaluating the merits of proposed
regulations. 6 7 This problem is particularly serious, as lawyers have
68
assumed a dominant role in lawmaking.
There also is evidence that the number of lawyers and competition
among them inversely influences the quality of the legal system. Delaware,
for example, is the state that is ranked highest for the quality of its legal
system. It may not be a coincidence that Delaware also has fewer lawyers
69
per capita than the United States average.
III. SELF-REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME

HAS GONE

In light of the observable increases both in the amount of competition
and conflict among lawyers, it is time to ask whether the legal profession is
best governed by self-regulation. The test of whether self-regulation should
be used is simple: Does the legal profession internalize the costs-as well
70
as the benefits-generated by self-regulation?
As a purely descriptive matter, a core requirement of any system of
regulation is the ability to control the firms and individuals subject to the
regulation. This, in turn, depends on the extent to which the regulatory
entity enjoys monopoly power over the industries, firms, and people it
regulates. Self-regulation, like other forms of regulation, becomes less
effectual as the costs of avoiding regulatory sanctions decline. For
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC's") power over
insider trading declines as traders are able to avoid the SEC's reach by
71
moving their transactions offshore.
In the context of a private, self-regulatory organization, this point
becomes even clearer. Take, for example, the power of the New York
66. J. P. Nettl, The State as a Conceptual Variable, 20 World Pol. 559, 585 (1968).
67. Jonathan R. Macey, Civic Education and Interest Group Formation in the American
Law School, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1937 (1993).
68. See Ribstein, supra note 63, at 327-38.
69. How the States Stack Up in Attorney Counts, Economic Growth and Malpractice

Measures,

Expansion

Management,

http://www.nashvilleareainfo.com/Docs/How%20the%20States%20Stack%2Up%20in%20

Attomey%20Counts,%20Economic%20Growth%20and%20Malpractice%20Measures.pdf
(last visited Oct. 22, 2005).

70. For an application of this theory of self-regulation in the context of the regulation of
for-profit stock exchanges, see Macey & O'Hara, supra note 11.
71. David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Controlling Insider Trading in Europe
and America: The Economics of the Politics, in Law and Economics & the Economics of
Legal Regulation 149, (J.-Matthias Grof von der Schulenburg & Gbran Skogh eds., 1986).
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Stock Exchange ("NYSE") to enforce its rules over listed firms. The
NYSE's ability to serve as an effective self-regulatory organization depends
on its ability to sanction listed firms that break its rules. In turn, the ability
of the NYSE to sanction listed firms depends on the market power of the
exchange. Historically, an exchange such as the NYSE was a very effective
self-regulatory organization because it could enforce its rules-and thereby
enable listing firms to make credible commitments to obey them-by
72
threatening to delist firms that disobeyed their rules.
Over time, however, as technology and rival markets developed, the
threat of delisting subsided. Firms that were delisted would simply move to
rival trading venues with similar liquidity characteristics, and more
73
congenial rules.
The paradigmatic illustration of this phenomenon is the one-share, onevote listing requirement. During the 1980s, the senior management of
several firms listed on the NYSE were concerned about the possibility of a
hostile takeover. Because of this, management wanted to defend itself by
recapitalizing the firm with additional classes of voting stock, to be held by
management, which would have significantly greater voting rights than the
shares held by other shareholders. The problem with this recapitalization
strategy was that it violated an unambiguous NYSE rule that
all shares of
74
common stock of listed companies could have only one vote.
Significantly, several venerable listed firms-notably General Motors
Corporation and Dow Jones, Inc.-that wanted to engage in these so-called
"dual-class recapitalizations" elected to proceed with their plans and risk
delisting.7 5 If they were delisted, their shares could have migrated to a rival
trading venue, such as the American Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ, both
of which permitted dual-class recapitalizations. 76 The result was that the
NYSE was forced to relax its listing requirements, and to petition the SEC
to impose a uniform voting rights standard for all publicly traded firms. 77
72. The New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") still claims to have this power, although
it is rarely, if ever, used. See NYSE, How Regulation Works, Enforcement,
http://www.nyse.com/regulation/howregworks/1022221394131.html (last visited Oct. 22,
2005).
73. See Megan Barnett, Seeing Double, USNews.com, Jan.
26, 2004,
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/040126/26nasdaq.htm.
74. One-Share
One-Vote
Rule
Definition,
http://www.investorwords.corn3417/one-share-one-voterule.html (last visited Oct. 22,
2005); see also Roberta Karmel, The Future of CorporateGovernance Listing Requirements,

54 SMU L. Rev. 325, 343-46 (2001). For an argument that the one-share, one-vote rule is
economically suboptimal, see Shaun P. Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2006
U.

Ill.

L.

Rev.

(forthcoming),

available

at

http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=621323.
75. See Karmel, supra note 75, at 343-47.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 346. In Business Roundtable v. SEC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ultimately held that the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") did not have the authority to adopt a uniform voting rights standard. 905 F.2d 406
(D.C. Cir. 1990). However, by the time the court decided this case, the NASDAQ, the
American Stock Exchange ("AMEX"), and the NYSE had adopted the SEC's proposed rule
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The situation of the bar is not much different than that of the NYSE. As
the monopoly power of the bar has declined, so too has its capacity and its
incentives to regulate itself. Indeed, in some ways, the self-regulatory
structure of the legal profession represents the worst aspects of selfregulation.
Legal self-regulation displays the typical self-interested
behavior of a cartel without any of the concomitant benefits that come from
organizing a "single collectivity" for the purposes of "promulgat[ing] and
enforc[ing] (beneficial) norms [such as norms] of good practice." 7 8 This
Article will refer to this behavior as "cartelization."
The admissions requirements to enter the profession (a college degree,
three years of law school, and a multiday bar exam); the restrictions on
nonlawyers practicing even the most rudimentary aspects of law; the
mandatory rules of confidentiality for lawyers, but not accountants and
other competitors (nonlawyer consultants and advisers); and restrictions on
marketing all benefit individual lawyers at the expense of clients and the
profession as a whole. The best explanatory paradigm for the behavior of
the organized bar is that it perpetuates its own existence by attracting
support from individual lawyers whose interests, as participants in an
ethical prisoners' dilemma, sharply diverge from the overall best interests
of the legal profession. The theory that the bar exists to promote the
provision of high-quality legal services is inconsistent with the bar's
unresponsiveness to the current trend of declining civility and
professionalism among lawyers.
Commentators' protests notwithstanding, it is highly unlikely that the
current system of self-regulation will be replaced any time soon with a
better alternative. Moreover, it remains unclear that a superior alternative
even exists. Rather, the question is whether courts and legislatures should
end the anticompetitive and ultimately ineffectual regulations that pass for
self-regulation of the bar.
Considering the potential benefits of lawyer regulation, Professor
William Simon looks to the example provided by the regulation of
corporations subject to U.S. jurisdiction that compete for corporate
charters. 79 Under this approach, each state would permit lawyers licensed
and none was willing to risk its ongoing relationship with the SEC by returning to the
previous rule. See Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, The Law & Finance of Corporate
Acquisitions 748-51 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that with SEC involvement, the NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ adopted a uniform listing standard resembling the SEC's Rule 19c-4); Robert

W. Hamilton & Jonathan R. Macey, Cases and Materials on Corporations 727 (8th ed.
2003). Moreover, the ruling in Business Roundtable, that the SEC lacked the authority to

promulgate rules of corporate governance, has been weakened considerably, if not
eviscerated entirely, by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745

(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). Sarbanes-Oxley gave a
significant amount of new power to the SEC in the realm of corporate governance. See 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 7211-19 (2005).
78. Simon, supra note 15, at 640-41; see also Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and
Civic Morals (Cornelia Brookfield trans., Free Press 1958); A.M. Carr-Saunders,
Professions, in 12 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 476 (1934).
79. Simon supra note 15, at 649.
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in other states to conduct business within that state, subject to restrictions
necessary to protect "local needs."'80 Given current restrictions on in-state
practice by out-of-state lawyers, Simon's suggestion would dramatically
increase the amount of competition among lawyers. Therefore, it seems
that Simon's conclusions may solve at least part of the problem of
cartelization by lowering barriers to entry, increasing competition, and
improving lawyer quality while simultaneously expanding client choice
among legal competitors. Without a monopolistic bar, self-regulation by
the bar would be replaced with direct local regulation better tailored to the
needs of local areas. Thus, this is one plausible alternative to the current
self-regulatory system.
As the many shortcomings of the current self-regulatory system
demonstrate, organizing an efficient regulatory system that generates
respect for important societal values such as trust and respect for the rule of
law will be difficult. Specifically, how do we design a legal system that
will increase lawyers' respect for what they do and for one another?
In my view, radical deregulation is the best way to achieve these
challenging goals.
The embarrassing lack of professionalism and
collegiality among lawyers is not the most incredible aspect of modern law
practice. Instead, it is remarkable that law is less collegial than other
professions. There are few reports of uncivilized behavior frequently
81
observed among lawyers who work in other professions or occupations.
In fact, there are few reports of such behavior even among lawyers outside
82
the U.S.
Why is this the case? Indeed, one must wonder whether American
lawyers' self-regulation has itself contributed to the decline in civic virtue

80. Id. at 650.
81. In its introduction to polling data released in 1997, the Harris Poll wrote,
Recent Harris Polls have found that public attitudes to lawyers and law firms,
which were already low, continue to get worse. Lawyers have seen a dramatic
decline in their "prestige" which has fallen faster than that of any other occupation,
over the last twenty years. Fewer people have confidence in law firms than in any
of the major institutions measured by Harris including the Congress, organized
labor, or the federal government. It is not a pretty picture ....
For the last thirty years Harris has been tracking the confidence people have in
the leaders of various institutions. In the most recent survey, only 7 percent of the
public said they had a great deal of confidence in the people running law firms.
This places law firms at the bottom of the institutions on the list. The 7 percent
figure is not only the lowest number recorded for law firms over thirty years, it is
actually the lowest number recordedfor any institution over thirty years.

Asimow, supra note 64, at 1372 & n. 136 (quoting The Harris Poll #37, released on August
11, 1997).
One author adds to the insight above:
By 1999, the confidence of people in institutions had risen across the board.
The number of people having confidence in law firms rose from 7 percent to 10
percent, but that was still by far the lowest percentage of any institution. Law
firms remained well below such commonly despised institutions.
Id. at 1372.
82. See, e.g., Atiyah, supra note 62, at 1015-28.
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within the profession in the U.S. It is plausible that the relentless focus on
advancing the narrow private interests of the legal profession-both
individual lawyers and law firms-has been a consequence as much as it
has been a cause of the increasingly competitive conditions in the legal
profession. Both the efforts at continued cartelization discussed above as
well as the increased competition among lawyers have contributed to the
decline in civility among lawyers. This situation seems unique to the
profession in that it is characterized as self-regulating, increasingly
competitive, and less frequently monitored by authorities in the field (like
judges). These factors may combine to explain at least partially the decline
in civility in the profession.
Finally, why is the legal profession characterized, simultaneously, both
by high barriers to entry and by high internal competition within the
industry? After all, the sole purpose for erecting high barriers to entry is to
stymie competition. If such barriers to entry exist, we should not observe
the vigorous competition among lawyers that clearly characterizes the
modern practice of law, particularly corporate law. It appears, however,
that we have the worst of all competitive environments: costly barriers to
entering the legal profession coupled with vigorous competition among
lawyers who have paid the high entry price. Thus, although barriers to
entry are still costly, they are no longer so prohibitive as to keep entry
sufficiently low as to assure a high rate of return on a costly investment
since such a return is now constantly decreasing due to increased
competition in the legal profession.
This situation creates stress and is likely responsible for the increasing
friction among lawyers. Lawyers reasonably are frustrated and demoralized
to have incurred very high costs to enter a profession only to find that they
must work very hard, encounter stiff competition for clients, and still earn
only a competitive rate of return. Further, the aggressive marketing and
client pandering necessary in today's legal world undermines lawyers'
collective self-esteem as well as the esteem in which lawyers are held by
83
the public at large.
The explanation for this seemingly puzzling combination of high barriers
to entering the legal profession and stiff competition within the profession
becomes clear by applying basic economic insights to our study of the
market for lawyers. In the past, lawyers earned substantial incomes relative
to the rest of the educated population. To maintain these high incomes, the
84
existing cohort of lawyers erected barriers to entering the profession.
Over time, people realized how lucrative law could be, and so they either
entered the profession or decided to compete with lawyers as accountants,

83. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
84. See Lydia Yu-Yeh Wang, American Women in Legal Education: A Historical
available
at
Perspective,
29
EurAmerica
181,
187-88
(1999),
http://www.ea.sinica.edu.tw/lib/abstract/29-3-4.pdf.
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consultants, or mediators. 8 5 However, the investment to enter these
professions became sufficiently high that the economic benefits of
becoming a lawyer decreased-lawyers began to earn only normal,
competitive rates of return once the costs of entering the legal profession
86
were considered.
However, lawyers' decreased profits did not lead to reduced barriers to
entering the profession. This is because removing these barriers would
result in even more lawyers, as it would be especially attractive to enter the
profession at lower cost than previous entrants. This, in turn, would enable
the new entrants to earn competitive rates of return while undercutting
incumbents, since the new entrants would not have to charge high fees to
recoup the costs of their initial investments to enter the profession.
Because of this problem, reform of the legal profession is not likely to
come from within. Despite the fact that the high returns for entering the
legal profession have been dissipated, existing lawyers still have incentives
to keep extant barriers high. This, in turn, indicates that reform of the legal
profession, if it is to come at all, must come from within. Unfortunately,
lawyers currently have little incentive to reform the profession. Thus, we
may be at a stalemate. As discussed above, lawyers have incentives to
encourage bar associations to increase barriers to entry, in order to reduce
competition. Competition encourages lawyers to act unprofessionally so
that they will be seen as zealous and effective advocates by clients and
retain their business. Additionally, since the bar associations are made up
of lawyers seeking to protect their own interests, self-regulation often leads
to little repercussion for such incivility, as the bar recognizes the needs of
lawyers and law firms to compete for business. Since reforming the
barriers to entry and deconstructing the self-regulatory regime are two
important steps in restoring civility to the profession, the adherence to the
status quo invites more incivility. However, stripping away these barriers
to entry may end this vicious cycle-more competition and direct
regulation by states will encourage professional conduct as lawyers will be
made to answer for their conduct in the stricter regulatory regime and
clients will have a variety of legal professionals to choose from, all of
whom must meet universal standards of professionalism.
CONCLUSION

Over time, the same forces that led to the cartelization of the legal
profession have led to the decline of professionalism and decency within
the profession. Unfortunately, the bar has transformed itself to serve the
self-interested needs of its members. Its associational activities are directed

85. See Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 Geo.

J. Legal Ethics 369, 406-10 (2004).
86. See, e.g., Your Investment in Legal Education, The University of South Dakota,
http://www.usd.edu/law/prospective-students/financial-aid/investmentlegaleducation.cfm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
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at reducing entry into the legal profession and devising rules that increase
society's demand for the services of lawyers. As William Simon observed,
there are plenty of voluntary bar associations, like the Bar Association of
the City of New York, the American College of Trust and Estate Council,
and the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers whose work advances
87
the practice of law for the mutual benefit of clients and society as a whole.
These voluntary associations should be encouraged. But the entry barriers
into the profession should be stripped away, regardless of the negative
short-term consequences on incumbent lawyers and law professors.

87. Simon, supra note 15, at 658.
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APPENDIX A: LAWYERS AND TORT COSTS IN SIX COUNTRIES

Lawyers

United States
West Germany
England and Wales
Italy
France
Holland

780,000
115,900
68,067
46,401
27,700
5124

Lawyers per
100,000
Population

Tort Costs as
% of GNP

312.0
190.1
134.0
81.2
49.1
35.2

2.4
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.6
-

88. See Orderin the Tort, The Economist, July 18, 1992, at 10-13; The Rule of Lawyers,
The Economist, July 18, 1992, at 3-4.
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In 2002, the median annual earnings of all lawyers was $90,290. The
middle half of the occupation earned between $61,060 and $136,810. The
lowest paid ten percent earned less than $44,490; at least ten percent earned
more than $145,600. Median annual earnings in the industries employing
89
the largest numbers of lawyers in 2002 are given in the following table:

Management of companies and enterprises
Federal government
Legal services
Local government
State government

89. U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 18.

$131,970
$98,790
$93,970
$69,710
$67,910
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